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La mobilité internationale des jeunes adultes espagnols huit ans après la crise
économique, matière à réflexion
Josefina Domínguez-Mujica, Juan Parreño-Castellano, Ramón Díaz-
Hernández and Claudio Moreno-Medina
This article was prepared within the framework of the RDI project CSO 2016-80158-R “La nueva
emigación desde España: perfiles, estrategias de movilidad y activismo político transnacional”
[New Emigration from Spain: Profiles, Strategies of Mobility and Transnational Political Activism],
part of the State Programme for Research, Development and Innovation in Challenges Facing
Society, financed by the Spanish Ministry of Economy, Industry and Competitiveness (EDRF Funds).
 
Introduction
1 The  global  crisis  has made  Spain  an  interesting  observatory  from which  to  analyse
migration patterns in times of economic crisis. During the years of economic expansion,
before the crisis  (2008),  Spain led the European ranking in immigration (Domínguez-
Mujica et al., 2014) thanks to the pull of job opportunities for immigrants in secondary-
sector employment niches. However, the market for foreign workers was hit hard with
the onset of a severe recession in 2008, and the disparity between the levels of wellbeing
of the Spanish and foreign population grew significantly in the early years of the crisis
(2008-2010) (Godenau et al., 2017). This triggered a considerable decline in immigration
while also promoting re-emigration and the return of former immigrants.
2 A second stage commenced in 2011 with what has been called the public or sovereign
debt crisis, brought on by the fact that certain countries issued more bonds to finance
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their  accumulated  budget  deficits.  Containment  of  this  deficit  created  tensions  and
problems between the Eurozone member-states that sought to keep it under control and
the Southern countries which had incurred that debt. This situation gave rise to stringent
austerity policies for Spain as well as Greece and Portugal. In line with those policies, the
governments of these countries adopted tight budgets that caused public investment to
contract and hit the self-employed and the middle classes very hard. It was during this
second crisis  period that emigration spiked among Spanish young adults,  plagued by
unemployment and the dearth of  job prospects,  especially  in the most  highly-skilled
professions. As Pumares notes (2017, p. 134), “This second stage clearly affected young
people who had finished their studies and were entering the market, but had no jobs to
go to, as well as young people who had begun to work, but because they had been with
their  companies  a  short  time,  were  the  cheapest  to  dismiss  when adjustments  were
made”.
3 However, eight years down the road, it is necessary to determine whether or not the
migration trends of this second stage are changing as the Spanish economy begins to
show signs  of  recovery  –  still  incipient  at  best  –  and how emigration processes  are
intertwined with returns and re-emigrations at the dawn of a post-crisis era. There is
solid  evidence  of  a  higher  mobility  level,  typical  of  today’s  more  complex  and  less
predictable world. This in turn reveals the obsolescence of the old emigration patterns
that formerly characterized Southern European countries, which reversed their net flows
at the turn of the century and thus effected a migration transition.
4 In order to address this idea, in this paper we use different procedures to measure data
obtained from sources at the Spanish National Statistics Institute (INE) and the Spanish
Ministry of Employment and Social Affairs and present the results in graphics and tables.
The structure  of  this  study is  as  follows.  Firstly,  it  describes  the  state  of  the  art  in
research on the correlation between the economic crisis and the recent emigration of
Spanish citizens. Secondly, it presents the sources and methodology used in this research.
The third chapter discusses mobility indicators during the crisis years and the early post-
crisis period. Fourthly, it analyses the geographical aspect of this phenomenon, i.e. how
crisis and post-crisis situations are related to the Spanish diaspora and its consolidation.
Finally, the paper summarizes the most relevant discoveries made in the course of our
research.
 
What we do and do not know about the migration of
young adult Spaniards during the crisis: state of the
art
5 As stated above, the decline in immigration, the recommencement of Spanish emigration
and  the  new  profile  of  emigrants,  contrasting  with  that  of  the  last  major  wave  of
outbound Spaniards (1960-1973), can be linked to the crisis’s severe impact on countries
in  the  weak  European  periphery  (King,  2015).  Consequently,  the  economic  austerity
measures implemented during the hardest years – from the debt crisis (2011) onwards –
and their budgetary effects triggered a surge in the emigration of Spanish youth and
young adults (25-34 years old),1 as the outflow figure registered two years later clearly
shows2 (Table 1).
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Table 1. Correlation between statistical indicators on unemployment and emigration.
 
Unemployment rate of young adult (25-34
yo) Spaniards
 
Outflows  of  young  adult  (25-34  yo)
Spaniards abroad
2009 17.97 2011 12,302
2010 20.60 2012 11,367
2011 21.74 2013 13,919
2012 25.41 2014 16,068
2013 27.40 2015 19,694
2014 25.37 2016 16,413
Pearson: 0.92
Sources: National Accounts. Working Population Survey. Migration Statistics. INE
6 This migration process has attracted a great deal of attention from the Spanish academic
community, as attested by the abundant literature published on the subject (López D.,
2010; Reher et al.,  2011; Arango et al.,  2014; Navarrete, 2014; Domingo & Blanes, 2015;
López-Sala & Oso, 2015; Pumares & González, 2016; Domínguez-Mujica et al., 2016, etc.).
The emigration process has also received wide media coverage,  generating numerous
journalistic  articles  and  other  forms  of  social  communication  on  the  topic  (Díaz-
Hernández et al., 2015; Díaz-Hernández & Parreño-Castellano, 2017).
7 Beyond Spain’s borders, the socio-demographic and geo-demographic parameters of this
process  have  also  been analysed  by  other  researchers,  who link  it  to  the  migration
behaviour  of  Southern  European  countries  during  the  crisis  (Herm & Poulain,  2012;
Glynn,  2014;  Triandafyllidou  &  Gropas,  2014;  Fonseca  &  McGarrigle,  2014;  Recchi  &
Salamońska, 2015; Montanari & Staniscia, 2017, Domínguez Mujica & Pérez García, 2017,
etc.). In their interpretation of this emigration stage, said authors point to the role of
educational and professional backgrounds as well as the truncated ambitions of future
employment for these young people, whose families had focused their financial efforts
and pinned their hopes on the upward social mobility of their descendants (Parreño-
Castellano et al., 2016). As a result, the mass media has presented emigration as a loss of
social success for middle-class families, whose destiny was envisioned quite differently in
the  collective  Spanish  mind.  They  have  also  examined  these  emigrants’  political
disaffection and feelings of anomie with regard to the economic and social situation in
Spain, due to a perceived deterioration of the standards and ethics of social coexistence
(King et al., 2014; Bygnes, 2015).
8 At the same time, migrants have created a new framework of political participation based
on a new form of migrant associationism, developing political strategies and practices in
communities that overflow national borders (such as Marea Granate, Oficinas Precarias,
etc.,  in  Spain’s  case)  (López-Sala,  2017)  and,  paraphrasing  Levitt  (2001,  p.  203),
occasionally coalesce into diasporas if a “fiction of congregation” takes hold. Social media
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and ITC have made it easier for young people to receive information on events, trends
and culture in real time, giving rise to new forms of communication among migrants and
between them and the societies to which they belong (Koikkalainen, 2012).
9 From this perspective, the tendency of researchers to focus on the emigration of skilled
individuals is hardly surprising. The global trend of an unprecedented increase in the
flow of skilled migrants is accompanied by rising intra-European mobility, fostered by the
European Higher Education Area,  university student exchange programmes (Erasmus,
Leonardo da Vinci,  etc.) and the European Job Mobility Portal (EURES).  The idea that
“migrating to learn can mean learning to migrate” (Li et al., 1996) suggests that student
mobility (graduates and post-graduates) is an integral part of transnational migration
systems, whose networks have paved the way for the current circulation of skilled labour
(Findlay et al., 2017; Glorius, 2017).
10 The aforementioned characteristics make it clear that the outbound migration of Spanish
nationals after the crisis requires new and different explanations for an equally different
social  phenomenon.  The  most  suitable  theoretical  framework  for  interpreting this
process is  that  of  the “mobility turn” (Urry,  2000;  Kaufmann,  2002;  Montanari,  2005;
Cresswell, 2006; Kellerman, 2006; Sheller & Urry, 2006; etc.), which argues that greater
attention should be paid to flows than to points of origin or destination, for the direction
and speed of mobility processes are more important than the destinations themselves,
and  mobility  barriers,  though  they  do  exist,  have  cracks  that  cannot  be  ignored
(Montanari & Staniscia, 2016). This conceptual approach is appropriate for the unstable
world of the new century, marked by the globalization of production and consumption
and new forms of economic integration and social conduct.
11 Finally,  when  analysing  this  process  from a  long-term perspective,  on  the  verge  of
economic recovery, it is even more essential to examine the new emigration stage from
the angle  of human mobility,  as  King & Christou (2011)  precociously  suggested with
regard to return migrations, as residing or being in a certain place is an intermittent
phenomenon that interacts with other types of connection and communication processes.
Therefore,  according to Cresswell  (2006),  mobility must be considered not only as an
empirically observable phenomenon but also as an ideological concept synonymous with
freedom, transgression, creativity, life itself and embodied experience. This may well be
the most accurate interpretation of the recent emigration trend and its attendant return
and  re-emigration  processes,  for  they  clearly  evidence  a  genuine  tension  “between
mobility, on the one hand, and a search for a stable home(land) in which to settle and
’belong’ on the other” (King & Christou, 2011, p. 454).
 
Sources and methodology
12 Any quantitative analysis of Spanish emigration must rely on data obtained from the
sources  offered  by  Spain’s  National  Statistics  Institute  on  Spanish  population  stocks
abroad and on outflows and inflows. In order to provide a comprehensive overview of
these quantitative data on the emigration of Spaniards, we have condensed the available
information and its sources in Table 2.
13 Nonetheless, we are aware that there may be gaps in this information due to the under-
registration of emigrants who have failed to complete bureaucratic formalities (Romero-
Valiente, 2016), particularly among Spaniards residing in a European Union country that
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does not require them to obtain work permits, those planning to stay abroad for less than
one year, or those living as undocumented immigrants and waiting to regularize their
status. In many cases, formal registration is also delayed because migrants are unsure of
their future plans.
 
Table 2. Statistical information from Spanish sources.
Data on population stocks
Consular registration records from the Deputy Directorate of
the Ministry of Employment and Social Affairs
Census of Spaniards Residing Abroad (PERE-CERA) from the
National Statistics Institute (INE)
Data  on  outflows  and  inflows
(expressed as microdata)
Residential  Variations  Statistics  (EVR)  from  the  National
Statistics Institute (INE)
Migration  Statistics  (ESMI)  from  the  National  Statistics
Institute (INE)
Created by the authors
14 In  terms  of  methodology,  we  evaluated  the  statistical  information  as  a  whole  and
segmented by age group, nationality, source country and host country. Additionally, we
calculated different rates (net and gross migration,  emigration and return rates)  and
standardized statistical data when necessary.
15 Special mention must be made of the analysis of return flows. As Whaba (2014) rightly
points out, return migration is difficult to measure, and although this is usually achieved
by relying on the out-migration statistics of host countries and longitudinal surveys, in
this case we have used data on inflows of Spanish citizens born in Spain who re-register
as residents in Spain after formally registering the end of their residency in a foreign
country  (Residential  Variations  Statistics).  Therefore,  our  return calculations  are  not
based on a universe of migrants, which could have been evaluated by cohorts and time of
residence  abroad;  rather,  they  reflect  the  dimension  of  return  flows  in  relation  to
emigration flows and their evolution over time.
16 As for economic indicators, these were obtained from the Working Population Survey and
the National Accounts (GDP), as supplied by the National Statistics Institute.
17 The quantitative analysis  of  these data explains the evolution of  stocks and flows of
Spaniards abroad since the crisis began, providing deeper insight into the changes in
migration patterns during two different stages: the years marked by the financial and
debt crises and their consequences,  and the new situation of the incipient post-crisis
period (2015-2016).
18 Finally,  all  data  have  been  geo-referenced  to  produce  a  digital  map  (ArcGIS)  that
facilitates a clear geographical interpretation of the results, indicating the outbound and
return destinations of Spanish emigrants as well as the geographical variations observed
for the study period.
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Do emigration figures for young adult Spaniards
support a distinction between crisis and post-crisis
periods?
19 Inflows and outflows of  young adult  Spaniards have varied over the past  decade.  As
shown in Figure 1, during the economic boom period and the early years of the crisis,
outflows remained stable. Starting in 2011, with the introduction of measures to combat
the debt crisis in Spain, outflows registered a steep, nearly linear increase that did not
lose momentum until  2015.  Since then,  as  the economy has improved,  we observe a
decline in outflows. The lack of more recent data makes it impossible to conclusively
identify 2015 as a turning point in the period analysed. With regard to inflows, these
exhibited a gradual downward trend during the 2005-2013 period with only a few minor
inter-annual increases,  largely owing to the statistical relationship between outbound
and return flows. In 2014 the return numbers began to rise, due partly to the increase in
outflow data and partly to the improving economic situation; as a result, in 2016 returns
increased despite the drop in outflows.
 
Figure 1. Outflows and inflows of Spaniards (25-34 yo) abroad.
Source: Residential Variations Statistics, INE
20 Overlooking the statistical dependence of both variables, the crisis brought an increase in
outflows and a stagnation of returns, while the post-crisis shows a decline in outflows and
a rise in inflows. The latter statement is confirmed by other indicators, such as the ratio
of the total Spanish population residing abroad (PERE) (Table 3).
 
International mobility of young adult Spaniards eight years after the onset o...
Belgeo, 3 | 2018
6
Table 3. Return rate in percentages.
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
2.15 2.03 1.98 1.52 1.40 1.68 2.02 2.44
Source: Census of Spaniards residing abroad, INE
21 From a structural perspective, the evolution of Spanish migration figures in the crisis and
post-crisis years is related to economic parameters. We can see a significant correlation
between the  evolution  of  GDP and emigration  data,  and  between the  time  series  of
unemployment  in  Spain  and  return  data.  This  correlation  is  especially  strong  if  we
consider  that  it  takes  about  two  years  for  mobility  figures  to  reflect  trends  in  the
behaviour of economic data, as noted earlier. Unemployment benefits, family support,
the underground economy,  etc.,  are factors that delay mobility for financial  reasons,
whereas  migratory  success,  even  if  only  partial, tends  to  delay  return  processes.
Therefore, the correlation between GDP and emigration figures for Spaniards between
ages 25 and 34, factoring in a two-year time lag between the series, is inverse and quite
strong,  as  shown in Figure 2,  where the trajectories  of  the two variables  practically
mirror each other. The same is true of the correlation between the unemployment rate
for young adults and the migration rate of this group, as illustrated in Figure 3, but in this
case with a direct least-square coefficient.
 
Figure 2. Correlation between GDP and emigration.
Sources: National Accounts. Migration Statistics. INE
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Figure 3. Correlation between unemployment and emigration.
Sources: Working Population Survey. Migration Statistics. INE
22 Both graphs clearly show that GDP and unemployment evolved differently during the
crisis and post-crisis periods, with 2013-14 being the turning point. On a macroeconomic
scale,  that moment marked the beginning of a timid recovery.  The turning point for
migration flows came later in 2015-16, when upward GDP and downward unemployment
appear to align with mobility data.
23 The crisis and post-crisis periods exhibit different trends not only with regard to inflows
and outflows but also in terms of the total mobility and net migration of young adult
Spaniards.  The  evolution  of  the  gross  migration  rate,  understood  as  the  sum of  all
migratory  movements,  points  to  steadily  rising  mobility:  more  movements  in  every
direction. Based on data on the foreign migration of Spaniards (INE) and the Spanish
population, the gross migration rate for Spaniards was, by our own calculations, 1.20 per
1,000 people in 2008; 1.48 in 2012 and over 2.55 in 2016, which seems to confirm a new
tendency towards higher mobility. However, if we observe the evolution of gross and net
migration,  we see that  mobility  increased during the crisis,  and it  is  only now,  in a
recovering economy, that both indicators have begun to drop (Figure 4); we are entering
a period of lower mobility among young adults thanks to the decrease in outflows and
because returning home tends to become more important to migrants later in life (ages
35-39) as the years begin to weigh on them.
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Figure 4. Evolution of gross and net migration of Spaniards (25-34 yo).
Source: Residential Variations Statistics, INE
24 In contrast to the predominant emigration of young adults during the worst years of the
crisis,  we  are  now  entering  a  new  and  as  yet  undefined  period  that  will  alter  the
composition of migration flows. It seems clear that the traditional model of migrations in
Southern European countries no longer applies to Spain at this juncture; we are now
facing  a  more  complex  situation  of  pendulum  migration,  in  a  scenario  of  fluid,
intermittent migration processes typical of the paradigm of human mobility.
25 To this we can add data provided by the INE on the bio-demographic composition of
inflows of Spaniards from foreign countries. This complementary analysis sheds light on
the trends observed in 2015 and 2016, which show signs of an incipient pattern change
corresponding to the early stages of economic recovery (referred to here as the post-
crisis  period),  with  indications  of  pendulum  mobility,  return,  circularity  and  re-
emigration.
26 The data on Spanish inflows from abroad (Figures 5 and 6) for two different years, at the
beginning of the emigration stage (2009) and the dawn of the post-crisis period (2016),
reveals a remarkable change in the ages of people on the move. In 2009, the two main
groups were adult and elderly migrants – the latter remnants of the emigration wave in
the 1960s and 1970s – but in 2016, the generally increasing inflows (the absolute figures
allow us to identify this phenomenon) included a surprising number of children, many of
whom may be predisposed to emigrate when they reach young adulthood. In other words,
in 2016 we begin to see a decline in the number of incoming retirement-age Spaniards
and a return phenomenon dominated by young adults and adults with children, many of
whom were born in Spain.
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Figure 5. Inflows of Spaniards from abroad. Structure by age in normalized data (2009).
Source: Residential Variations Statistics, INE
 
Figure 6. Inflows of Spaniards from abroad. Structure by age in normalized data (2016).
Source: Residential Variations Statistics, INE
27 In  summary,  given  the  quantitative  importance  of  inflows  and  outflows  and  their
structural differences by age, we can make out two sets of migration patterns, one during
the crisis and another in the post-crisis period. If the trend is ultimately confirmed, there
may be more returns in coming years, but this inflow will not resemble that of previous
decades, dominated by former emigrants past retirement age. Furthermore, the scenario
that determines migrations has changed: great strides have been made in the creation of
global markets, in corporate internationalization, in the qualification of the young adult
population, in interconnectivity and accessibility, in the frequency of student and tourist
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travel (which increases the likelihood of future job and residential mobility) and in the
activation of contact networks that facilitate inter-migrant community support. Thus, we
are almost certainly moving towards a higher, less unidirectional standard of mobility,
different from the one that defined the years of prosperity and crisis in Spain at the turn
of the century.
 
How should we interpret the gaining and losing areas
on the map of the Spanish diaspora?
28 We need to identify and confirm the patterns of migration expressed in space and time; in
other  words,  to  see  if  the  ties  between  countries  and  societies  that  defined  Spain’s
migration history still exist, or if there are changes that indicate a division between the
aforementioned crisis  and post-crisis  periods.  In order to do so,  we must  consider a
number of factors: the economic conditions in host countries, as well as the economic
situation  in  Spain;  corporate  internationalization  and  the  creation  of  transnational
market structures; the laws and regulations of the European Union and other states; the
globalization of job markets for skilled migrants; post-colonial ties; etc. 
29 Figure 7 shows the outflows and Figure 8 the inflows for the last eight years (2009-2016). 
The first map shows that the largest outflows are to Western Europe and the Americas,
although secondary flows extend to most of the world’s countries. As illustrated below,
the United Kingdom, France, Germany, the United States and Switzerland, along with
Ecuador, are the main host countries, with other EU states and Latin American countries
in second and third place, respectively.
 
Figure 7. Outflows of Spaniards (emigration) 2009-2016.
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Figure 8. Inflows of Spaniards (return) 2009-2016.
The circles correspond to the total groups of migrants and the yellow segments to those between
25-34 yo.
Source: Residential Variations Statistics, INE
30 However, if we consider the proportion of young people to total outflow by country, we
notice several differences that reveal the influence of unique pull factors on young adults.
In Ireland, Austria, Denmark, the United Kingdom, Sweden, the Netherlands, Germany,
China, Australia, Norway, Chile, Canada, France, the United States and Switzerland, young
adults represent a very high percentage of outflows, indicating strong work-related pull
factors. A healthier economy and a job market where skilled professionals are in demand
have been decisive factors in determining the direction of outflows, and another is the
Spanish  economy’s  own  internationalization  process,  with  important  companies
operating in the United Kingdom, France,  Italy,  Australia,  Canada,  the United States,
Saudi Arabia, China, Chile, Panama, Peru and other countries. Yet young adult Spaniards
account for a small fraction of the outflows to Latin American countries like Ecuador,
Venezuela,  Argentina or Colombia,  as these trends largely correspond to the second-
generation descendants of past immigrants (from Ecuador, for instance) or flows related
to historical pendulum migrations (e.g. with Venezuela and Argentina).
31 If  we  consider  the  distribution  of  young  adult  (25-34  years  old)  emigration  by  host
country  for  both  periods,  we  find  that  the  five  countries  mentioned  above  (United
Kingdom,  Germany,  France,  United  States  and  Switzerland)  absorb  over  half  of  all
outflows in both the crisis (2009-2014) and post-crisis period (2015-2016), accounting for
56.5% and  58.6%  of  movements,  respectively.  Additionally,  the  majority  of  all  other
movements in both periods were headed for other EU countries and Latin America, with
the exception of China and a few Gulf nations.
32 Although the distribution of flows in the two periods presents no significant differences,
there are some details worth mentioning. While the relative importance of Great Britain,
Germany  and  Switzerland  in  outflows  is  rising  steadily,  all  other  Western  European
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nations have lost ground, with the exception of Denmark, Sweden and Poland. Outside
the European Union,  the numbers for almost all  countries – excepting Chile,  Mexico,
Australia, New Zealand, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Japan – have
declined. It is also interesting to note the relatively diminished flows to the United States,
Brazil, Argentina and China. This can be explained by changes in economic situations and
migration policies.
33 Naturally, since emigration is a precondition for return, the same geographical areas are
affected by return movements of young Spaniards. The majority come from the United
Kingdom, France, Germany and the United States. In the cases of Switzerland, France and
Germany, the volume of inflows is relatively lower than the ratio of outflows to total
inflows. The opposite is true of those returning from Ireland, China, Portugal, Morocco,
Brazil and Argentina, all countries that maintain a higher gross migration rate.
34 These disparities between outflows and inflows force us to calculate the return rate for
each period, which we have done for countries with a gross mobility greater than 0.7
percent. For the 45 countries we analysed (which together account for 93.6% and 95.4% of
gross mobility in each period), the average return rate was 29.7% during the crisis and
34.5% in the post-crisis period; in other words, approximately three out of every 10 young
people who emigrate abroad have returned in the last two years.
35 In the incipient post-crisis era (2015-2016),  nearly all  countries register more returns
(primarily due to less outflow), but return rates from Latin America are much higher than
in the previous period, especially in the cases of Venezuela,  Ecuador and Brazil.  This
geographical  trend seems to indicate that many Latin American countries were “safe
haven” destinations for Spanish emigrants during the worst years of the crisis, especially
when their  economies  needed skilled professionals  (Brazil  until  2013,  Ecuador  hiring
Spanish doctors for its universities, etc.), and lost that status once the economic situation
in  Spain  started  to  improve.  These  types  of  migration  relationships  reinforce  post-
colonial ties (Avila-Tàpies & Domínguez-Mujica, 2015), the full significance of which is
revealed if we consider the investments of Spanish companies in those countries or the
flow of Latin American emigrants towards Spain. In contrast, returns increased less in the
case  of  certain  European  Union  host  countries  (Sweden,  Denmark,  Poland,  Ireland,
Luxembourg, Italy and Portugal) as well as the United States, Mexico, Japan, Andorra and
the Philippines (Figure 9).
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Figure 9. Return ratio (2009-2014/2015-2016) and return trends for Spaniards (25-34 years old).
 
Conclusions
36 This paper has analysed the international mobility of young adult Spaniards since 2008,
generally  considered the end of  the period of  economic  prosperity  which Spain had
enjoyed since the turn of the century. With the onset of the public debt crisis in 2011, the
already battered Spanish economy was plunged even deeper into recession, and the first
obvious signs of an increase in migration outflows appeared. Consequently, the decline in
immigration and the return and re-emigration of existing immigrants was compounded
by the emigration of native Spaniards, especially young adults between ages 25 and 34.
These outflows continued to rise until 2015 because, as explained above, it takes about
two  years  for  migration  figures  to  reflect  trends  in  gross  domestic  product  and
unemployment due to various factors (family support, existing savings, unemployment
benefits, etc.) that qualify the temporal relationship between the economic situation and
international mobility.
37 Until 2014, inflows or returns of young Spaniards remained stable, but in 2015 and 2016
signs of change indicated that the economy and job market were starting to bounce back,
and migration patterns began to change as well. Not considering the problem of under-
registration, statistical data points to new trends that will have to be confirmed in the
coming years. In 2015 and 2016 total and young adult emigration flows began to slow
down, returns increased slightly – although the increase is less noticeable among young
adults and more so when we look at total volume – and both gross and net mobility rates
went down.
38 To this we must add a change in the structure of returnees by age. At the beginning of the
crisis, as in years past, returnees were predominantly adults between the ages of 25 and
39, and the second largest group consisted of people aged 60 to 69 who had emigrated
decades  earlier;  however,  in  the  recent  period  of  economic  recovery,  returnees  are
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usually adults between 30 and 44 years old, often accompanied by children between ages
5 and 14, and the flow of retirement-age returnees has lessened.
39 Based on these data, it is our conclusion that the international migration patterns being
recorded in the recent post-crisis period are different from those of  the crisis  years,
although this will have to be confirmed as the economy continues to recover.
40 From a geographical perspective, and saving potential distortions due to the economic
circumstances of each country and changes in national migration policies, the migration
of young adult Spaniards exhibits a territorial behaviour that is the product of six main
factors:  the  creation  of  a  common  economic  area  in  Europe;  the  economic
internationalization of Spanish companies; the creation of a global job market for skilled
workers, affecting more and more countries; the growing power of new economic hubs
across the globe; and the existence of post-colonial and cultural ties to Latin America.
This explains why, in both periods, the most significant flows are to/from countries in the
European economic area, and why there are also relevant flows to/from other economic
areas such as the United States, Australia, China or countries on the Middle East.
41 However,  in  the  early  years  of  economic  recovery,  outflows  to  Latin  America  have
decreased and returns from that continent have increased; this translates into stronger
migration ties with European Community countries and others whose job markets have a
need for skilled young adults (Switzerland, the United States, Australia, etc.), even though
the return rate has risen slightly due to the decrease in outflows. This paints a picture of
Latin America as a “safe haven” job market, which made it a sensible option in the worst
years of the crisis thanks to post-colonial relations and cultural ties.
42 In addition, we must also consider the steadily rising return rates from other countries
like China, Saudi Arabia and Qatar. All of this information allows us to deduce that, when
it comes to mobility, young Spaniards in the post-crisis period prefer European Union
states and other developed countries in the English-speaking cultural and financial world
(United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, etc.) within the global market
for highly skilled professionals.
43 We must not overlook another geographical peculiarity that characterizes the mobility of
young  Spaniards  in  both  the  crisis  and  post-crisis  periods, manifested  in  the  high
emigration  and  high  return  rates  that  mark  Spain’s  relationship  with  certain
neighbouring countries. This is particularly true of Morocco, Portugal and Andorra and
points to a generalization of international pendulum movements that further complicates
the migration panorama, sketching a more complex global scenario where new processes
of fluidity and intermittence, typical of the paradigm of human mobility, interact.
44 In short, we believe that there are two different sets of migration patterns for young
Spaniards, one for the crisis years and another for the post-crisis period, although the
latter will have to be confirmed as the process of economy recovery continues. In any
case, the current situation differs from that of the prosperous years around the turn of
the century (1998-2008); mobility today is more important due to the increasing number
of skilled young Spaniards who choose to enter the global (and specifically the European)
job market, especially if we bear in mind that Spain’s economic restructuring process was
achieved by cutting wages. In this situation, the skilled migrant, if not the expatriate,
carries more weight than in the past, implying that Spain has a new role to play in the
international economy.
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NOTES
1. We  limited  this  category  to  Spanish  citizens  born  in  Spain  to  exclude  processes  of  re-
emigration  or  return of  former  immigrants.  Thus,  our  analysis  of  the  migration  patterns  of
young adult Spaniards also excludes individuals born in Spain to earlier immigrants who came
with the waves that entered Spain around the turn of the century, as they are not yet 25-34 years
old.
2. The correlations between economic and emigration data are based on the two years after the
beginning of the debt crisis, as the effects of the crisis on emigration are slow to appear.
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ABSTRACTS
Eight years after the economic crisis began in Spain (2008), its impact on migration trends is due
for re-examination. The emigration of young Southern Europeans during the crisis, motivated by
high unemployment  and the  lack  of  opportunities,  has  been analysed by  various  academics.
These scholars have highlighted the modification of migration patterns in Portugal, Spain, Italy
and Greece, countries with a positive net migration rate during the years of economic growth,
and have studied the reversion to their former status as net emigration countries during the
recession.  However,  despite the fact  that today,  eight years after the onset of  the crisis,  the
economy has begun to show signs of recovery, there is evidence that migration trends among
young Spaniards have changed. Consequently, the main hypothesis of this paper is that Spanish
migration patterns have been altered by a tendency towards higher mobility at the dawn of the
post-crisis era.
Huit ans après la crise économique en Espagne (2008), il convient de réexaminer son impact sur
les tendances migratoires. L’émigration des jeunes Européens du sud durant la crise, du fait des
taux de chômage élevés et du manque d’opportunités, a été analysée par plusieurs spécialistes.
Ces investigations ont mis l’accent sur les modifications des tendances migratoires du Portugal,
de l’Espagne, de l’Italie et de la Grèce, pays qui avaient connu une migration nette positive durant
les  années  d’essor  économique  et  qui  sont  revenus  à  leur  situation  traditionnelle  de  pays
d’émigration avec  la  récession économique.  Cependant,  les  tendances  migratoires  des  jeunes
Espagnols, huit années après la crise et alors que l’économie commence à montrer à nouveau des
signes positifs, ont changé. Dès lors, l’hypothèse principale de cet article est que le modèle de
migration espagnol s’est transformé et se caractérise par un schéma de mobilité plus fluide à
l’aube de l’après-crise. 
INDEX
Mots-clés: Espagne, crise économique, mobilité, retour
Keywords: Spain, economic crisis, mobility patterns, return
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